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Constitutional Personae 
Cass R. Sunstein* 
Abstract 
American constitutional law is dominated by four Constitutional Personae, who 
can be identified by their inclinations, their temperaments, their sensibilities, and 
their self-presentations. Indeed, many constitutional debates consist of stylized 
disagreements among the leading Personae: Heroes, Soldiers, Burkeans, and 
Mutes. Earl Warren is the iconic Hero; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. is the iconic 
Soldier; Felix Frankfurter is the iconic Burkean; Alexander Bickel speaks for the 
Mute. At different times and places, and under different constitutional provisions, 
liberals and conservatives can be Heroes, Soldiers, Burkeans, or Mutes. While 
the appeal of one or another Persona undoubtedly has psychological and social 
sources, the choice of the appropriate Persona, in particular cases, should be a 
product of the proper theory of constitutional interpretation, which must in turn 
be chosen on the basis of pragmatic judgments about the magnitude and number 
of errors. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Debates over constitutional law familiarly explore competing theories of 
interpretation. Should judges follow the original understanding of the Constitution,1 or 
attempt to reinforce democratic processes,2 or offer moral readings?3 The differences 
among competing theories are of course fundamental. But if we investigate the arc of 
constitutional history, we will discover another set of differences. They involve 
disparate Constitutional Personae – judicial roles and self-presentations that sharply 
separate judges (as well as academic commentators). The leading Personae are Heroes, 
Soldiers, Burkeans, and Mutes. Broadly speaking, Heroes are willing to invoke the 
Constitution to invalidate state and federal legislation; Soldiers defer to the actions of 
the political branches; Burkeans favor only incremental change; and Mutes prefer not to 
decide difficult questions. 
 
The four Personae4 help to define not only internal disputes on the Court but also 
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1 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1998). 
2 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). The core of the theory can be found 
in United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
3 RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION (1997). 
4 Cicero also spoke of four personae, but in a quite different context and for quite different purposes. 
See Christopher Gill, Personhood and Personality: The Four-Personae Theory in Cicero, De Officiis 
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famous cases and entire eras of Supreme Court history. Countless past and present 
constitutional disputes involve contests among Constitutional Personae. Consider, for 
example, recent disputes over same-sex marriage,5 the Affordable Care Act,6 the Voting 
Rights Act,7 and affirmative action.8 In all these disputes, and many more, each of the 
four Personae play important roles (while also cutting across standard ideological and 
methodological divisions).9 We can also identify periods of Supreme Court heroism, 
soldiering, and Burkeanism (though not muteness), certainly with respect to particular 
constitutional clauses, and sometimes with respect to the Court in general. 
 
An understanding of the Personae cannot, of course, displace standard theories of 
constitutional interpretation. On the contrary, the choice of Persona is dependent on the 
selection of some such theory, certainly as a matter of logic. A particular theory (say, 
originalism) might lead a judge to be heroic, soldierly, Burkean, or mute, as the 
controversy and the occasion demand. I shall devote considerable attention to this point 
and hence to the relationship between the Personae and competing constitutional 
theories. Nonetheless, an understanding of the Personae provides a novel and 
illuminating perspective on recurring constitutional debates (or so I shall attempt to 
show). 
 
It is important to emphasize that the Personae are both abstract and stylized, and 
no real-world judge “is” one or another of them. To be sure, particular judges can be 
associated with particular Personae, but any such association is best taken to mean only 
that on especially prominent occasions, the judge has assumed that Persona, or that the 
judge shows a tendency to adopt that Persona in the most important and challenging 
cases. Over the course of a career or even a year, many real-world judges will adopt each 
of the Personae. Some judges switch their persona from case to case frequently because 
their preferred theory of interpretation calls for such switching; other judges have a more 
or less consistent persona because their preferred theory calls for it; still other judges 
change their stance for strategic or other reasons. 
 
It is important to see that adoption of a Persona need not be opportunistic or 
manipulative; it is generally an authentic reflection of the role that “falls out” of the 
judge’s preferred theory of interpretation. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that a judge 
might adopt a Persona for strategic reasons. For example, a judge might prefer in the 
abstract to be a Hero, but in light of relevant constraints (such as precedent, internal 
dynamics on a multimember court, or anticipated public reaction), she might write as a 
Burkean -- with the hope that the Burkean path might eventually produce the same 
result that heroism would dictate. Muteness might also be strategic, a form of biding 
one’s time until the time is right.10 
                                                                                                                                                                    
I, 6 OXFORD STUD. IN ANCIENT PHIL. 169 (1988). 
5 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
6 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
7 Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
8 Fisher v. University of Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
9 See below. 
10 While the focus throughout is on American constitutional law, the four Personae can be found in 
countless legal systems. For example, the Israel judge Aharon Barak is a well-known Hero, see 
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As we shall also see, a Persona might be a reflection of a judge’s actual thinking 
or instead a judge’s preferred self-presentation. A judge might, for example, write and 
present herself as a Burkean even though her actual conception of the judicial role is 
heroic. Few judges are likely to say or think, “I am a Burkean,” but a judge might well 
have an explicit or implicit account of the judicial role that leads to Burkean votes and 
opinions. Such a judge would be likely to have a Burkean self-presentation. No judge 
self-identifies as a Mute, but all judges think that on occasion, silence is appropriate, and 
when they do, they are self-conscious Mutes. Most judges do have a soldierly conception 
of their role, at least on certain occasions. And while no judge will announce, “I am a 
Hero,” many judges do believe that the Constitution sets out ambitious principles of one 
or another kind, and that it is appropriate for judges to invoke those principles even if the 
result is to invalidate legislation. In especially interesting cases, a judge might present 
himself as a Soldier, and that presentation might even reflect his self-understanding – but 
the judge might be taken as a Hero in the relevant community. As we will see, a Persona 
might also reflect not a judge’s self-understanding or self-presentation, but how a judge 
is received by some, many, or all members of the community. 
 
The remainder of this Essay is organized as follows. Part II describes the four 
Personae. Part III sets out stylized conflicts among the Personae, describing their 
standard positions and conflicts. Part IV investigates how different theories of 
interpretation can lead to different Personae. Part V discusses the relationship between 
Personae and what is sometimes described as “judicial ideology.” Part VI discusses how 
to choose a Persona, with an emphasis on the logical priority of the appropriate theory of 
interpretation. 
 
II. Heroes, Soldiers, Burkeans, and Mutes 
 
A. Heroes 
 
Because of its importance and social salience, the heroic Persona may be the 
most familiar. The defining characteristic of Heroes is that they are entirely willing to 
invoke an ambitious understanding of the Constitution to invalidate the decisions of the 
federal government and the states. Heroes come in many varieties, but whatever their 
favored approach to constitutional interpretation, Heroes believe in an imperial and 
potentially transformative role for the federal judiciary in the Constitution’s name. 
 
Within the categories of Heroes and heroism, we can find significant differences 
of degree, from relatively modest Heroes who are willing to strike down acts of 
Congress without having major reformist aims, to more far-reaching Heroes 
(Superheroes?) who have large-scale visions and are willing (and perhaps even eager) to 
embark on 
significant projects of social change. To sharpen the category, I will generally 
understand Heroes to have a high degree of theoretical ambition, with an 
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55 
acknowledgement that their ambition may stem from disparate theories of constitutional 
interpretation. Both originalists and nonoriginalists can be Heroes; we could imagine 
Second Amendment Heroes, or Equal Protection Heroes, who draw either on their 
preferred account of the original understanding or on a moral reading of both provisions. 
 
All Heroes can be considered “activist” in the distinctive sense that they are 
willing to use the Constitution to strike down acts of Congress and of state 
legislatures.11 It is important to see that as used here, the term “heroic” should not be 
taken to be one of approval; it is merely a descriptive term. In ordinary language, 
soldiers can of course be heroes as well, and while I aim to distinguish them here, we 
shall encounter some interesting alliances and antagonisms between the Hero and the 
Soldier. 
 
Brown v. Board of Education12 is the iconic heroic decision, and its author, Chief 
Justice Earl Warren, is the iconic heroic judge.13 The Warren Court was the Court’s 
iconic heroic era, helping to define a conception of the federal judiciary for a generation 
and more.14 But other eras have been heroic too, and many judges have been heroic, at 
least on prominent occasions. John Marshall was the original judicial hero,15 especially 
insofar as Marbury v. Madison16 established the institution of judicial review.17 The Dred 
Scott decision18 is an important part of the constitutional anticanon,19 and even if it is 
egregiously wrong, it reflects a large-scale vision of the constitutional settlement, and so 
is unquestionably heroic in the sense in which I use that term. The Lochner era had 
many heroic moments (even if some of the justices on the Lochner Court understood and 
presented themselves as Soldiers or Burkeans).20 For decades, William Brennan21 and 
Thurgood Marshall22 counted as exemplary Heroes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
11 For this definition of activism, see LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL 
JUDGES (2013).  
12 347  U.S.  483 (1984). 
13 See JIM NEWTON, JUSTICE FOR ALL: EARL WARREN AND THE NATION HE MADE (2007). 
14 See MORTON HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE (1994).  
15 See in this vein JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION (1998). 
16 5 U.S. 137  (1803). 
17 Chief Justice Marshall was also a complex Hero in the sense that many of his decisions did not involve 
invalidation of the actions of the political branches, but instead gave the national government room to 
maneuver and thus count as soldierly (in the sense in which I am using that term). See Smith, supra note. 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819), is of course the most famous decision in this vein. A more 
soldierly decision is Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
18 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
19 See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 406–12 (2011). 
20 For different perspectives, see HOWARD GILMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED (1992); 
PAUL KENS, LOCHNER V. NEW YORK: ECONOMIC REGULATION ON TRIAL (1998); DAVID 
BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER (2012). 
21 See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
22 See, e.g., San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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With his willingness to offer large pronouncements about values such as liberty 
and dignity,23 Justice Anthony Kennedy may well the most heroic member of the current 
Court,24 though Antonin Scalia25 and Clarence Thomas have heroic moments and 
tendencies.26 In recent years, heroic judges have voted to invalidate the Affordable Care 
Act27 and university affirmative action programs.28 
 
Disparate constitutional provisions provide the occasions for heroism, and 
Heroes qualify as such with respect to particular provisions, not the Constitution as a 
whole. (General heroism, as I am understanding it here, would be difficult to imagine, 
because it fits with no recognizable theory of constitutional interpretation.) There are 
Free Speech Heroes,29 Equal Protection Heroes,30 Due Process Heroes,31 Religious 
Liberty Heroes,32 Commerce Clause Heroes,33 Second Amendment Heroes,34 Executive 
Power Heroes,35 Takings Heroes,36 Standing Heroes,37 and many more. A judge might 
endorse heroism with respect to one provision but firmly reject it with respect to others. 
Indeed, that pattern is common. When the Court as a whole is heroic for certain periods, 
its heroism can be found in connection with particular provisions — with, for example, 
the Warren Court using the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause,38 and the 
Lochner Court invoking the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause.39 
Heroism has enthusiastic academic defenders,40 and academic commentators are 
often inclined to lionize judicial Heroes and to argue for more in the way of heroism.41 
But it is important to see that heroism’s academic defenders are highly diverse in both 
their ideological orientation and their theory of interpretation. In the aftermath of the 
era that Brown helped to define, many academic commentators saw that decision as 
establishing the appropriate judicial role, and they hoped for many Browns, vindicating 
large-scale conceptions of liberty or equality, and reforming society accordingly.42 
                                                      
23 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
24 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); United 
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). For a general account, see FRANK COLUCCI, JUSTICE 
KENNEDY’S JURISPRUDENCE (2009). 
25 District of Columbia  v. Heller, 554  U.S. 570  (2008). 
26 Fisher v. University of Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2422 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
 
27 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2642 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, 
Alito, JJ, dissenting). 
28 See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2422 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
29 See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
30 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
31 Roe  v. Wade, 410  U.S. 113 (1973). 
32 Engel v. Vitale, 370  U.S. 421  (1962). 
33 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
34 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
35 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
36 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
37 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
38 See  note supra. 
39 See  note supra. 
40 See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES (2008) 
41 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C, DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION (1999). 
42 See, e.g., Frank Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term — Foreword: On Protecting the Poor 
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969) (arguing for constitutional welfare 
rights). 
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Ronald Dworkin’s discussion of Hercules, rendering moral judgments, is the 
most sustained academic elaboration of the heroic judicial Persona.43 Emphasizing the 
heroic role of judges in promoting democratic self-government, John Hart Ely dedicates 
his influential book to Earl Warren, specifically observing that “you don’t need many 
heroes if you choose carefully.”44 Those who embrace Ely’s democracy-reinforcing 
theory of judicial review are likely to support heroism, at least some of the time. 
 
More recently, those with a libertarian conception of the Constitution, like 
Randy Barnett45 and Richard Epstein,46 are seeking to promote judicial heroism through 
aggressive use of certain constitutional provisions in the interest of a particular 
conception of liberty.  Efforts to promote a broad understanding of the Takings Clause 
are meant to produce a form of heroism.47 Contracts Clause heroism has also been 
vigorously defended.48 Consider too recent efforts to understand the Commerce Clause 
and the Necessary and Proper Clause in such a way as to impose serious restrictions on 
congressional authority.49 As we shall shortly see, originalists can certainly be Heroes, 
and there are Burkean Heroes as well (though their Burkeanism severely qualifies their 
heroism). 
 
B. Soldiers 
 
At the opposite pole from Heroes are Soldiers, who argue in favor of following 
orders. The defining feature of the judicial Soldier is a willingness to defer to the will of 
his superiors, typically understood as the political branches of government.50 In ordinary 
language, of course, the idea of the Soldier can be understood in many different ways. 
As I understand them here, Soldiers are deferential, and they understand or portray 
themselves to be subordinates, essentially doing what others have told them to do. 
(Originalists, who also portray themselves as Soldiers, provide an important wrinkle, 
to which I will turn in due course.) 
 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes is a hero to many, and he may well deserve 
the label. But in terms of Personae, he was largely a Soldier, as reflected in his 
famous suggestion, “If my fellow citizens want to go to Hell I will help them. It’s my 
job.”51 With his famous dissenting words in Lochner, Holmes helped to define the 
Persona of the Soldier for more than a century: “a constitution is not intended to 
embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation 
of the citizen to the state or of laissez faire. It is made for people of fundamentally 
differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar, 
                                                      
43 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 238-75 (1985). 
44 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, at v (1980). 
45 See RANDY BARNETT, RECOVERING THE LOST CONSTITUTION (2005). 
46 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985). 
47 See id. 
48 See Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703 
(1984). 
49 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION (2006). 
50 This is a familiar theme in the area of statutory interpretation. See Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Judges As Honest Agents, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 915 (2010). 
51 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Harold J. Laski (March 4, 1920), reprinted in 1 HOLMES-
LASKI LETTERS 248, 249 (Mark DeWolfe ed., 1953). 
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or novel, and even shocking, ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question 
whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United 
States.”52 To the extent that he favored protection of freedom of speech,53 Holmes 
was a Hero, not a Soldier, but his heroism was limited to that context. 
 
There are many distinguished academic defenses of the Solider.54 James Bradley 
Thayer, the great advocate of judicial deference to the outcomes of political processes, 
is the most important early expositor of the soldierly conception of the judicial role.55 
Adrian Vermeule is its most sophisticated contemporary proponent, offering a careful 
justification of judicial deference to the outcomes of political processes.56 Those who 
embrace populist accounts of constitutional law, who challenge judicial review, or who 
stress the sovereignty of We the People are likely to endorse the role of the Soldier.57 To 
some people, Soldiers are heroes, because they adopt the proper role and respect the 
limited place of the judiciary in the constitutional system. While Soldiers can be seen as 
heroes, they are emphatically not Heroes. 
 
As with heroism, so with soldiering: there are Equal Protection Soldiers,58 Due 
Process Soldiers,59 Commerce Clause Soldiers,60 Second Amendment Soldiers,61 Article 
II, section I Soldiers,62 Takings Soldiers,63 Standing Soldiers,64 and many more. A judge 
might endorse soldiering with respect to one provision but reject it with respect to 
others, and again this pattern is common. If a judge or a court embraces heroism in some 
domains, it is likely to embrace soldiering in others. There is no logical necessity here,65 
but the phenomenon is unmistakable, with (for example) the Warren Court and the 
Lochner Court showing the familiar pattern of selective heroism and soldiering. 
 
To this general account of the Soldier, there is an important qualification. While 
soldiering as I understand it is associated with judicial deference to the political process, 
and while I am treating Holmes as the iconic Soldier, other judges, with positions 
distinctly different from that of Holmes, can claim the mantle of Soldier as well. Insofar 
as originalists, such as Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Hugo Black,66 seek to speak for 
                                                      
52 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
53 See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
54 See, e.g., J. HARVIE WILKINSON, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (2012). 
55 James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. 
REV. 129 (1893). 
56 See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY (2006). 
57 See, e.g., LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2005); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY 
FROM THE COURTS (2000). 
58 Massachusetts  v. Murgia, 427  U.S. 307  (1976). 
59 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 171 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting). 
60 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Breyer, J.,dissenting). 
61 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
62 See Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
63 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
64 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
65 Across-the-board soldering is certainly possible and in some respects appealing, see VERMEULE, 
supra note, and across-the-board heroism is not unimaginable (though it would be difficult, and it is not 
easy to see how it might be defended). 
66 See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (Black, J., dissenting); Griswold v. Connecticut, 
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We the People,67 they can plausibly be described as Soldiers. Indeed, a form of 
soldiering is built into their self-presentation, and it is a large part of what gives 
originalism its intuitive appeal.68 They too contend that they are simply following orders, 
not offering moral readings or venturing their own personal accounts of what the 
Constitution requires. But these kinds of Soldiers are entirely willing to invalidate the 
actions of the federal government or of the states. To the extent that this is so, it is 
because they are Soldiers, not in spite of that fact.69 
 
We should therefore distinguish between first-order Soldiers, who defer to the 
judgments of the political process, and second-order Soldiers, who can in a sense count 
as Hero-Soldiers, willing to trump those judgments when the original public meaning of 
the Constitution so requires.70 In fact, many judges present themselves as second-order 
Soldiers, even if they reject originalism. They contend that they are merely following the 
Constitution, and adhering to its mandates, even if the result is to strike down legislation. 
We can go further. Soldiering is the most fundamental and enduring part of the judicial 
self-presentation and even of judges’ self-understanding.71 In referring to Soldiers, I shall 
be speaking of the first-order variety unless otherwise indicated. 
 
C. Burkeans 
Some judges are neither Heroes nor Soldiers but Burkeans,72 in the sense that they 
favor small, cautious steps, building incrementally on the decisions and practices of the 
past.73 Unlike Heroes, who celebrate ambitious accounts of liberty and equality or of the 
Constitution’s structural provisions, those who adopt the Burkean Persona emphasize the 
limits of large-scale theories. 
 
In dealing with cases involving basic rights, Burkeans do not want to embrace 
any kind of foundational theory. They argue for careful attention not to abstractions but 
to traditions, understood at a level of concreteness. Consider Burke’s own words, 
challenging the primacy of abstract theories: “And first of all, the science of 
jurisprudence, the pride of the human intellect, which, with all its defects, redundancies, 
and errors, is the collected reason of ages, combining the principles of original justice 
with the infinite variety of human concerns, as a heap of old exploded errors, would no 
longer be studied. Personal self-sufficiency and arrogance (the certain attendants upon all 
                                                                                                                                                                    
381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). 
67 See  Scalia,  supra note. 
68 Id.; ORIGINALISM (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007). For an illuminating and skeptical empirical 
study, see FRANK CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM (2012). 
69 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 US 570, 634-35 (2008) (“Constitutional rights are enshrined 
with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them, whether or not future 
legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that scope too broad”). 
70 See, e.g., id. 
71 “Formalism,” in the pejorative sense, consists of claiming to follow orders, and hence to be 
soldierly, when some kind of discretionary judgment is being made. See H.L.A. HART, THE 
CONCEPT OF LAW (1965). Some purported soldiering is a species of formalism in that sense (“faux 
soldiering”). It follows that a judge may be a Hero but present herself as a second-order Soldier. 
72 The classic source is Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in THE PORTABLE 
EDMUND BURKE 416 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1999). 
73 See Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353 (2006); see also CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME (1999). 
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those who have never experienced a wisdom greater than their own) would usurp the 
tribunal.”74 
 
Burkeans also prefer narrow rulings, focused on the facts of particular cases. When 
sitting on the court of appeals, Chief Justice Roberts captured this preference with an 
aphoristic summary of the Burkean position in constitutional law: “[I]f it is not necessary to 
decide more, it is necessary not to decide more.”75 Committed Burkeans will choose 
Burkeanism in all or most contexts, but some judges might be more cautious (and in a sense 
Burkean) with respect to Burkeanism itself, insisting that the decision whether to be 
Burkean is best resolved case-by-case. And in arguing against theoretical ambition and in 
favor of narrowness, a judge might endorse Burkeanism with respect to one provision but 
reject it with respect to others.76 
 
With their modesty and humility, Burkeans might seem to be close cousins of 
those Soldiers who are reluctant to invalidate legislation, and alliances are certainly 
possible between the two Personae. But the two are fundamentally different breeds. 
Burkeans do not purport to be following anyone’s orders or will. They acknowledge and 
even insist that judges exercise discretion, and to Burkeans, that fact poses a serious 
problem. Burkeans claim that it is best for judges to exercise their discretion in a way 
that brackets foundational questions and that ensures small, incremental steps from the 
status quo. They believe that it is important for judges to speak softly and to carry a 
small stick.77 
 
Notwithstanding this point, some Heroes present themselves as Burkeans, 
contending that a heroic decision is merely an incremental step.78 We can certainly 
imagine at least mildly heroic Burkeans, who are genuinely committed to 
incrementalism, and who reject the largest theories, but who are nonetheless willing to 
wield judicial power so as to invalidate legislation. On some occasions, Burkeans 
might be counted as Heroes as I have used the term, though of a relatively modest 
variety. 
 
Because of his enthusiasm for tradition,79 his commitment to case-by-case 
judgment,80 and his skepticism about large-scale theories,81 Justice Felix Frankfurter can 
be seen as an iconic Burkean. Justice John Marshall Harlan falls in the same category, 
and in some ways, he may be the most Burkean justice of all.82 Justice Sandra Day 
                                                      
74 Burke, supra note, at 456–57. 
75 The “cardinal principle of judicial restraint” is that “if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary 
not to decide more.” PDK Labs., Inc. v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 
2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
76 See  Sunstein,  supra note. 
77 A closely related Persona, not discussed here, is that of the Trimmer, who attempts to steer between 
the poles. See Cass R. Sunstein, Trimming, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (2009). 
78 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), is a plausible example. 
79 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 589 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
80 See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 16 (1952). 
81 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 589 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
82 See TINSLEY YARBROUGH, JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN: GREAT DISSENTER OF THE 
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O’Connor showed strong Burkean inclinations, especially insofar as she liked to focus 
narrowly on the facts of particular cases.83 Chief Justice Roberts has written a number of 
Burkean opinions,84 and hence on prominent occasions, he seems to write as a self- 
conscious Burkean. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg can also be counted as a Burkean, in 
the sense that she emphasizes the need to focus carefully on both facts and precedents.85 
From this catalogue, it should be clear that no less than Heroes and Soldiers, Burkeans 
come in different shapes and sizes. All of them prize narrow, theoretically unambitious 
rulings, but they may well disagree with one another. 
 
D. Mutes 
 
While Burkeans favor narrow and unambitious rulings, the Mute prefers to say 
nothing at all. Of course no judge can be a consistent or frequent mute, and for that 
reason, Mutes are infrequent players in the constitutional drama. No member of the 
Court, past or present, can be characterized as a Mute, and for obvious reasons. But 
when fundamental issues are at stake, the persona of the Mute will have its attractions. 
Constitutional avoidance is a preferred strategy of the Mute86; so too with doctrines of 
justiciability. With his emphasis on “the passive virtues,” through which the Court 
declines to rule, Alexander Bickel is of course the great theorist of constitutional 
muteness.87 
 
Bickel’s own approach emphasizes the strategic and prudential importance of 
silence, especially on large questions on which the nation is divided. In his account, 
premature judicial engagement could have a range of harmful consequences for both 
the nation and the Court.88 But others favor muteness on nonstrategic grounds, 
emphasizing what they regard as the restrictions of Article III.89 We can even identify 
Mute Soldiers, who maintain silence not for prudential reasons, but because of what 
they see as the commands of the Constitution itself. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
WARREN COURT (1991). 
83 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). For a popular account, see JOAN BISKUPIC, 
SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR: HOW THE FIRST WOMAN ON THE SUPREME COURT BECAME 
ITS MOST 
INFLUENTIAL JUSTICE (2006). 
84 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
85 See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2632 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Fisher v. Univ. of 
Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2432 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
86 See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Anthony Vitarelli, Comment, Constitutional Avoidance 
Step Zero, 119 YALE L.J. 837 (2009). 
87 See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1965). 
88 See id. 
89 See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing As An Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983). 
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Naim v. Naim,90 declining to pronounce on the constitutionality of restrictions on 
racial intermarriage, is the most prominent example of muteness in action. Poe v. 
Ulman,91 declining to review a Connecticut law forbidding the sale and use of 
contraceptives, is another prominent illustration. Hollingsworth v. Perry,92 invoking 
standing to dismiss a challenge to a California law banning recognition of same-sex 
marriage, is the most recent example; it might well turn out to be this generation’s Naim 
v. Naim. Here yet again, a judge might endorse muteness with respect to one 
provision (or even controversy), but reject it with respect to others. 
 
III. Dueling Personae 
 
It is easy to find examples of the Personae in action. Many constitutional 
disputes pit them directly against each other. Such disputes are often illuminatingly seen 
as stylized debates among the four Personae, with one or another judge assuming a 
particular role, depending on the issue and the context. 
 
A. In the Abstract 
 
In those disputes, the Hero might invoke a large-scale understanding of equality 
or liberty, or perhaps of the limits on federal power under Article I. The Soldier 
responds that courts should defer to the outcomes of the political process unless the 
constitutional infirmity is quite clear – and concludes that it is not. In this way, the 
Soldier accuses the Hero of arrogance or hubris.93 The Hero responds, implicitly or 
explicitly, that the Soldier is willing to disregard clear constitutional constraints on 
government power, and even to disparage the power of judicial review, usually because 
what the Hero sees as the Solider’s unduly narrow conception of liberty or equality. 
 
The Burkean rejects both positions. Like the Soldier, he accuses the Hero of 
hubris, but he contends that the Soldier is arrogant in his own way, insofar as he adopts 
a large-scale posture of deference (which the Burkean regards as grounded in a theory 
or abstraction of some kind). Against both the Hero and the Soldier, the Burkean insists 
on the importance of avoiding large pronouncements and the value of engaging 
carefully with the particular facts.94 
 
The Hero might not respond to the Burkean at all, but if he does, he will insist 
that the Constitution identifies a general principle and that clarity in the law is far 
preferable to case-by-case obscurantism.95 The subtext of the heroic response will be that 
                                                      
90 350  U.S.  891 (1955). 
91 367  U.S.  497 (1961). 
92 133 S. Ct. 2652  (2013). 
93 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 60 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Adkins v. Childrens 
Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923)(Holmes, J., dissenting); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964) (White, J., dissenting); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2697 (2013) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
94 Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
95 For relevant discussion, see Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law As A Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1175 (1989). 
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the Burkean is a coward. The Soldier will regard the Burkean as a temporizer, unwilling 
to show the proper respect for the democratic branches and leaving a degree of chaos for 
lower courts to sort out. Where the Burkean sees prudence, the Soldier sees a distinctive 
kind of arrogance, alongside an inexplicable focus on isolated cases. 
 
The Mute will object to the Hero and the Soldier on grounds similar to those 
invoked by the Burkean. To the Mute, the proper course is to allow the democratic 
process to play itself out. Judges ought not to be taking sides. Both invalidation and 
validation are unacceptable. For the Mute, invalidation is worst of all, because it 
disables self-government, but validation is also troublesome in light of its legitimating 
effect in the very domain that people are actively debating.96 The Mute is more 
sympathetic to the Burkean, but she believes that it is simpler and cleaner to stay out of 
the area entirely rather than to take an incremental step. 
 
Of course the Hero has no patience for the Mute, who (in the Hero’s view) is 
abdicating the judicial role and allowing the Constitution to be ignored in the process. 
The Soldier insists that the Mute is wrong to stay silent when judges might instead 
clarify that the issue is for the political process to resolve. The Burkean and the Mute 
have overlapping concerns, but the Burkean might well believe that a small, incremental 
step is highly desirable, because it moves the ball in the preferred direction. In the 
Burkean’s view, the Mute is too coy by half. 
 
B. On the Ground 
For the most vivid recent illustration of these kinds of disputes, consider 
academic and judicial debates over the constitutionality of restrictions on same-sex 
marriage.97 Heroes would want to insist that such restrictions are unacceptable; they 
would enlist the Equal Protection Clause in support of that conclusion. Citing the 
example of Brown, and even more the heroic decision in Loving v. Virginia,98 many 
academic observers have argued in this direction.99 By contrast, Soldiers would defer to 
the political process, saying, in Justice Scalia’s words, “the Constitution neither requires 
nor forbids our society to approve of same-sex marriage, much as it neither requires nor 
forbids us to approve of no-fault divorce, polygamy, or the consumption of alcohol.”100 
 
At least if they are not prepared to defer to traditions, Burkeans would favor 
narrow, incompletely theorized decisions, leaving the most fundamental questions for 
another day. For example, the Department of Justice urged a broadly Burkean approach 
to the constitutional challenge to California’s Proposition 9, contending that the Court 
should decline to resolve the largest questions and rule more narrowly that those states 
that have recognized same-sex civil unions cannot be permitted to deny those unions the 
                                                      
96 See  BICKEL,  supra note. 
97 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. (2013); ADAM LIPTAK, TO HAVE AND UPHOLD: THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE BATTLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2013). 
98 388 U.S. 1  (1967). 
99 See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex 
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994). 
100 Id. 
  
64 
label of “marriage.”101 Under this approach, the Court would bracket the question 
whether states could refuse to recognize same-sex marriages altogether. For their part, 
Mutes would use doctrines of justiciability to stay entirely out of this domain, and 
indeed the Court’s use of standing in Hollingsworth is a conspicuous example of the 
triumph of the Persona of the Mute.102 
 
We can find the same Personae in many other constitutional disputes. Roe v. Wade 
is heroic, and those who think the decision was wrong tend to claim the mantle of Soldiers, 
while Burkeans wish the Roe Court had ruled narrowly,103 and of course Mutes would try 
not to speak at all. Citizens United104 is an emphatically heroic decision, and the three non-
heroic Personae can easily be found in debates over campaign finance legislation.105 Heroes 
would like to invalidate the Affordable Care Act,106 while Soldiers would like to uphold 
it.107 Here yet again, Mutes would avoid the question, and Burkeans would seek to rule as 
narrowly as possible. 
 
C. The Lessons of History (Of Icons and Anti-Icons) 
 
Some of these disagreements are influenced by a reading of history and by an 
understanding of the lesson of canonical examples and counterexamples.108 I have noted 
that Heroes tend to invoke Brown, seeing it as iconic; above all, they do not want to be 
on the wrong side of history. For such Heroes, New York Times v. Sullivan109 and 
Reynolds 
v. Sims110 are also iconic. For many Heroes, Lawrence v. Texas111 is a recent exemplar of 
an iconic decision (though it can also be characterized as Burkean insofar as it is 
relatively narrow). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
101 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9–11, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) 
(No. 12-144), 2013 WL 769326; see also John Schwartz & Adam Liptak, U.S. Asks Justices to Reject 
California’s Ban on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/01/us/politics/administration-to-urge-justices-to-overturn-a- gay-marriage-
ban.html. 
102 113 S. Ct. 2652, 2659  (2013). 
103 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 
63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985). 
104 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
105 For example, Heroes, Soldiers, and Burkeans can be found in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
106 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2642 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, 
Alito, JJ, dissenting). 
107 Id. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
108 On counterexamples, see Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011). Authors 
of counterexamples, and architects of the Anticanon, might be regarded as Villains. No judge, of 
course, seeks to assume the Persona of the Villain, and so I do not discuss Villains independently here. 
109 376  U.S. 254 (1964). 
110 377  U.S. 533 (1964). 
111 539  U.S. 558 (2003). 
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For many Heroes, prominent anti-icons include Plessy v. Ferguson,112 Korematsu 
v. United States,113 and Bowers v. Hardwick,114 upholding a criminal ban on same-sex 
marriage. Heroes do not want to write or join another Plessy, and they do not want to 
replicate the experience in Korematsu or Bowers. Concerned about what they see as judicial 
abdication during wartime,115 many Heroes see Korematsu in particular as an example of what 
can go wrong when judges operate as Soldiers. Other Heroes regard Wickard v. Filburn116 as an 
anti-icon insofar as it seemed to stretch the meaning of the Commerce Clause in such a way as 
to give Congress something akin to general police power. Some Heroes are skeptical of NFIB v. 
Sebelius117 and United States v. Carolene Products118 insofar as those decisions suggest a degree 
of deference to legislation that is, in their view, invalid. And for those who believe that Article 
III imposes sharp limits on standing, United States v. SCRAP is an anti-icon.119 
For their part, Soldiers tend to see West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,120 with its 
emphasis on judicial deference, as iconic. They think the same for Wickard, because of 
its deferential approach to the Commerce Clause, and also Katzenbach v. Morgan, with 
its endorsement of broad deference to congressional power under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.121 For Soldiers, Dred Scott122 tends to be the worst decision in the 
anticanon; they also focus on Lochner v. New York. They are acutely aware of Justice 
Holmes’ cautionary notes about the hazards of reading any particular moral or political 
theory into the Constitution. Many Soldiers believe that Roe v. Wade is a more recent 
incarnation of Lochner – and they invoke Roe as a reason for deference to political 
processes.123 Some Soldiers also object to Miranda v. Arizona,124 which they regard as a 
form of lawless Heroism. 
 
It is important to acknowledge, however, that second-order Soldiers understand 
Lochner, Roe, and Miranda as wrong not merely or even mostly because they 
invalidated the outcomes of democratic processes, but because they did so without a 
warrant in the Constitution. Hero-Soldiers reject Lochner and Roe, but they are perfectly 
willing to strike down limits on the individual right to possess firearms,125 to invoke the 
limited nature of the Commerce Power to strike down the Affordable Care Act,126 and 
generally to reinvigorate restrictions on national power. 
 
                                                      
112 163  U.S. 537 (1896). 
113 323 U.S. 214  (1944). 
114 478  U.S. 186 (1986). 
115 See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 
(2000). 
116 317 U.S. 111  (1942). 
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121 384  U.S. 641 (1966). 
122 See Scott v. Sanford,  60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
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context. 
124 384  U.S. 436 (1966). 
125 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
126 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2642 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, 
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Some Burkeans might approve of the Court’s sex discrimination cases, in which 
the Court did not rule broadly all at once, but instead proceeded narrowly and 
cautiously.127 For those Burkeans, the sex discrimination cases are iconic. Burkeans tend 
to see Roe as objectionable not because it took steps to protect the right to choose, but 
because of its heroism, embodied in a broad, ambitious ruling, going well beyond what 
was necessary to decide the case.128 In this sense, Roe is a Burkean anti-icon. As noted, 
Naim v. Naim occupies pride of place in the canon of muteness – and the 5-4 decision in 
Hollingsworth v. Perry,129 understood as an exercise of the passive virtues, promises to 
join it. 
 
D. Personae As Literary Devices 
 
One way to understand the Personae is as rhetorical or literary devices. On this 
understanding, the Soldier (for example) has a characteristic rhetorical strategy, which 
is to say, “I am compelled to do X, even though I might like to do Y.” This strategy 
might be, and is, used both by first-order and second-order Soldiers. Something similar 
could be said about Burkeans, who like to say that they are building narrowly on 
precedent, even if what they are doing is a novelty or a substantial departure, or 
plausibly characterized as a form of Heroism. To be sure, it is not possible to disguise 
or feign muteness, but a judge might adopt the Persona of the Mute not because of a 
commitment to soldiering (as in the view that Article III requires muteness) but as a 
rhetorical gambit designed as part of “the long game.” On this view, the analysis of 
Constitutional Personae might properly regarded as belonging to the study of judicial 
politics or even law and literature.130 
 
This view is not exactly wrong, and much can be learned by examining the 
Constitutional Personae in this light. But I am understanding them quite differently here. 
We might well see the Personae not as a matter of judicial politics or rhetoric, but 
instead as a product of how different judges actually understand their jobs, and of how 
they perform those jobs in different contexts. When scholars defend the moral reading of 
the 
Constitution,131 they are not adopting a mere rhetorical stance,132 and the same is true of 
judges who essentially attempt moral readings.133 And when judges operate as Soldiers, it 
may well be because that Persona captures their understanding of their appropriate role. 
These points bring us directly to the relationship between theories of interpretation 
and the Personae. 
 
 
                                                      
127 See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
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IV. Personae and Theories of Interpretation 
 
It is natural to wonder about the relationship between the Constitutional 
Personae and standard theories of constitutional interpretation. We can already glimpse 
the basic answer, which is that the standard theories can lead to adoption of one or 
another of the Personae, depending on the occasion. The words “depending on the 
occasion” are important. As we shall see, any one of the Personae can fall out of a given 
theory of interpretation. What matters is exactly when it does so, and here the relevant 
theory is critical. 
 
A. Theories First, Persona Second? 
 
Suppose that judges embrace originalism. Such judges would be Mutes when the 
original understanding of Article III so requires, but they would be Hero-Soldiers if 
(say) the original understanding of the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment 
calls for invalidation of the Affordable Care Act or affirmative action programs, and 
they would become Soldiers if the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires them to uphold restrictions on same-sex marriage. If, by contrast, judges 
believe in democracy-reinforcement, they might be Heroes on voting rights but Soldiers 
in the context of abortion rights.134 And if judges endorse a moral reading of 
Constitution, they might be Heroes with respect to same-sex marriage but Soldiers with 
respect to economic rights (or vice-versa, depending on their preferred moral theory).135 
 
From these examples, it seems clear that many judges will adopt a Persona in 
accordance with their own theory of constitutional interpretation, whether or not that 
theory is made explicit. Of course it is true that judges may lack a simple or unitary 
theory, and they may adopt a Persona on the basis of a collection of considerations 
that cannot be captured in any kind of theory or “ism.” 
 
There are some important (if speculative) qualifications. We have seen that 
judges may adopt a Persona for strategic reasons. They may speak as Burkeans even 
though their own theory is Heroic, and the same is true for second-order Soldiers. They 
may act as Mutes even though they would like to be Heroes (and plan to be). Some 
judges are undoubtedly drawn to a Persona for social or psychological reasons, and as a 
matter of causation, the Persona might well antedate their adoption of the relevant 
constitutional theory. Some judge’s self-understanding draws them to the idea of the 
Soldier, whereas others are led to Burkeanism or to enthusiasm for the Hero. Before they 
even begin to engage with questions of theory, some people greatly admire the idea of 
heroic judging (as elaborated, for example, by Dworkin136 or Ely137), whereas to others, 
that idea seems anathema or a form of hubris. In my view, these social or psychological 
motivations are important and even foundational, but that claim is highly speculative. 
 
                                                      
134 See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973). 
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B. Context 
 
We should also be able to see that different judges may well adopt different 
Personae in different situations, perhaps because of their preferred approach to 
constitutional interpretation, perhaps because of contextual considerations. Judges 
need not be inconsistent or flighty if they are Heroes on one day and Mutes on the 
next. Whatever their approach, most judges are likely to believe that there is a place 
for “the passive virtues.”138 When the nation is sharply divided, they might therefore 
choose to be Burkean or Mute even if they would choose Heroism if a national 
consensus authorized it. 
 
For example, someone who believes in moral readings (as did Bickel, 
emphatically139) might also believe in prudence, and for that reason might believe that 
silence is golden if courts seek to preserve their own political capital. In the words of 
Gerald Gunther, Bickel believed that courts should be “100 percent principled, 20 
percent 
of the time.”140 Gunther was a critic of Bickel, but a believer in the passive virtues could 
easily embrace the basic idea. A judge who believes in democracy-reinforcement could 
similarly agree that there is a time and a place for muteness. 
 
V. Personae and Ideology 
 
Commentators often divide judges along political lines, and reasonably so. A 
great deal of empirical work shows that in ideologically contested cases, Republican 
appointees vote differently from Democratic appointees, and Republican appointees 
differ from one another, as do Democratic appointees.141 We should now be able to see 
that a central division, not involving ideology as such, is among Personae. As noted, 
Justice Kennedy is often a Hero while Chief Justice Roberts is often a Burkean, while 
Justice Antonin Scalia is frequently a Hero-Soldier. Consider, for example, Justice 
Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Heller,142 invoking the original understanding in 
support of the view that the Second Amendment creates an individual right. 
 
During and after the Lochner era, the great liberal judges were Soldiers.143 
Rejecting the heroism of judicial decisions invalidating minimum wage and maximum 
hour legislation, celebrated Soldiers (above all Justice Holmes144) argued in favor of 
judicial deference to legislation. During the Warren Court, by contrast, conservatives 
assumed the mantle of the Soldier.145 They treated the heroic Warren Court decisions of 
the 1950s and 1960s as a form of hubris. And indeed, a judge can be heroic on a 
                                                      
138 BICKEL,  supra note. 
139 See  BICKEL, supra note. 
140 See Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues,” 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1964). 
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Tuesday (for example, by voting to invalidate a provision of the Voting Rights Act146) 
and a Soldier on Wednesday (for example, by voting to uphold the Defense of Marriage 
Act147). The rapid switch from Hero to Soldier might seem to be a form of 
inconsistency, even hypocrisy, but the appearance may well be misleading, for it need 
not be anything of the kind. The shift might be an artifact of the judge’s theory of 
interpretation. 
 
Edmund Burke is known of course as one of history’s great conservatives,148 and 
to qualify as such, all Burkeans are conservative in the sense that they seek to build 
incrementally on the past. But some Burkeans (as I am understanding them) build 
incrementally in a liberal direction, whereas others build incrementally to the right. In 
many areas, Byron White was a liberal Burkean,149 while Chief Justice Roberts is a 
conservative one, as was Sandra Day O’Connor.150 
 
There are multiple theories of constitutional muteness, and they need have no 
political valence. We have seen that some judges embrace an account of Article III, 
grounded in text and history, that forbids courts from issuing advisory opinions or 
hearing generalized grievances.151 That account would produce a number of Mute 
decisions. But we have also seen that by emphasizing “the passive virtues,” Bickel 
meant to draw attention to, and to embrace, quite pragmatic and strategic uses of silence, 
designed to limit the occasions for judicial intervention into the political domain.152 
Bickel did not contend that his own account was required by the text of Article III; his 
emphasis was on prudence. 
 
On one view, muteness is an extreme point on the same continuum with 
Burkeanism, reflecting a form of judicial statesmanship, and Mutes are Burkeans with 
less courage (or more prudence). What is clear is that the passive virtues can be 
enlisted in the service of either conservative or progressive goals. 
 
VI. Choosing A Persona 
 
Which Persona is best? Is it possible to offer criteria by which to answer 
that question? 
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A. The Right Theory 
 
I have suggested that the answer lies in the identification of the right theory of 
constitutional interpretation. If originalism is the right theory, the appropriate Persona 
will be an artifact of that theory. So too with judges who embrace a democracy- 
reinforcing approach to judicial review, or who insist on a moral reading. The correct 
theory is logically prior to the choice among the Constitutional Personae, who may 
well appear as they do because of the theory that lies in the background.153 
 
This is particularly easy to see for Heroes and Soldiers; both of these Personae 
will “fall out” of the prevailing theory of interpretation. Which Persona falls out of any 
particular theory will depend on the nature of the particular question. The same is true 
for Burkeans and Mutes. We could have a Burkean theory of interpretation, seeing 
constitutional law as closely akin to the common law.154 Even if a judge believes that a 
Burkean theory is only part of the picture, and unlikely to be complete, Burkean 
considerations, counseling prudence, might make Burkeans out of those who also have 
enthusiasm for some other theory of interpretation. If an originalist believes in the claims 
of precedent, he might sound like a Burkean, and to the extent that he is willing to 
abandon the original understanding to protect precedent, he might even turn out to be a 
Burkean, at least in particular cases.155 We have seen that muteness may be a product of 
originalism, but it might also be part of an account of interpretation that allows a place 
for silence. 
 
It would be possible to end simply by insisting that the choice of Personae must 
be parasitic on the choice of a theory of interpretation (bracketing psychological or 
strategic factors that may lead a judge to favor a particular Persona). But that claim 
leaves open the question about how to make that choice.156 On that question, a few 
remarks will be in order. 
 
B. What’s Interpretation? 
 
Some people insist that the very idea of interpretation leads to a particular 
account of what judges must do to claim that they are engaged in the interpretive 
enterprise. 
Perhaps interpretation, to qualify as such, entails a search for the original “intent”157 or 
the original public meaning,158 or instead for a judgment that puts the existing legal 
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158 Saikrishna Prakash, Radicals in Tweed Jackets: Why Extreme Left-Wing Law Professors Are 
Wrong for America, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2207 (2006). 
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materials in the best constructive light.159 If so, the idea of interpretation generates the 
appropriate theory, which in turn produces the relevant Persona. 
 
It is true that some activities cannot be counted as interpretation at all. If a judge 
disregards the constitutional text and rules however he sees fit, he is not engaged in 
interpretation. But it is false to say that the idea of interpretation, as such, makes the 
choice among competing approaches. A judge who is committed to interpretation might 
nonetheless choose to disregard the original intent in favor of the original 
understanding 
— or vice-versa. Such a judge might emphasize specific and concrete understandings or 
instead understandings that are more abstract and general160 — or vice-versa. Such a 
judge may or may not favor moral readings. There is nothing in the idea of 
interpretation that resolves real debates among competing theories or about competing 
Personae. 
 
C. Errors 
 
As a first approximation, the choice is an inescapably pragmatic one, and it 
turns on the magnitude and number of errors (“error costs”).161 Suppose that Heroes 
move society in the right direction, because they have the right conception of liberty 
and equality. If so, it would seem to follow that judges should be heroic.162 But suppose 
that judicial Heroes are error-prone and that Burkeans would do far better, in the sense 
that they would make fewer and less damaging mistakes. If so, Burkeanism is 
preferable, because it is safer insofar as it minimizes the seriousness of errors. 
 
However simple, these points suggest the need for a comparative assessment, 
involving the judgments of judges and of those whom they would displace.163 In a world 
in which judges systematically err and in which democratic processes do well, the 
argument for Soldiers would be very strong. In a world in which judges are excellent at 
correcting for democratic deficits – for example, by safeguarding rights that are 
indispensable to well-functioning political process – a democracy-reinforcing 
conception of review, overseen by Heroes, would be difficult to contest. The argument 
for such Heroes would be weakened if judges are unable to unwilling to undertake that 
task. There is no acontextual argument on behalf of Heroes or Soldiers, and nothing in 
the idea of interpretation can settle the choice. 
 
An evident complication is that to know whether we have error costs, we need an 
account by which to identify error. Suppose that democratic self-government is one of 
the rights to which people are entitled. If so, the arguments for Soldiers are strengthened. 
Those who reject soldiering might respond that the ideal of self-government has its own 
                                                      
159 See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note (contending that interpretation involves tasks of “fit” 
and “justification”). 
160 See JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011). 
161 To the same general effect, see Vermeule, supra note. 
162 I am bracketing the question whether self-government is one of the rights that people have and 
whether and when Heroism is objectionable for that reason. 
163 See Vermeule, supra  note. 
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internal morality,164 and that an imperfectly democratic process, or a process that fails to 
respect basic rights, calls for heroism not in opposition to democracy but in its name.165 
Originalists might want to insist that to be worthy of the name, Soldiers do not merely 
implement legislative will. They must follow the will of We the People as well, and that 
approach will call for invalidation of democratic outcomes, and indeed for decisions that 
might be mistaken for heroism.166 Hero-Soldiers – they will insist – are Soldiers, not 
Heroes at all.167 
 
An independent complication involves the level of generality at which judges are 
choosing among Personae. It is hard to make an across-the-board judgment in favor of 
Heroism or Muteness, but a judge might be confronted with a decision whether to be a 
Soldier in general or only in particular cases, and the same decision might be made by a 
judge contemplating Burkeanism. A judge could plausibly conclude that some 
provisions and some occasions call for soldiering, but that others do not, and that no 
categorical judgment for or against soldiering would make sense. 
 
To be sure, some advocates of soldiering argue vigorously on behalf of a 
categorical or general choice in favor of the Soldier.168 They may be correct, but an 
evaluation of their view, and of whether a general commitment to soldiering is 
preferable to a case-by-case judgment about whether soldiering makes sense in the 
circumstances, requires an assessment of the magnitude and number of errors associated 
with the competing approaches.169 The same can be said for Burkeans. Perhaps a 
Burkean approach makes sense for the Due Process Clause but not for the Equal 
Protection Clause,170 or perhaps such an approach is best for the Constitution as a whole. 
Here too an assessment of error costs is inescapable. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
Constitutional law is populated the Four Personae, who argue with one another in 
a wide variety of periods and contexts. For example, we can find debates between 
Heroes and Soldiers in disputes over substantive due process,171 free speech,172 and 
property rights173; Heroes and Mutes are often in conflict.174 Because the arguments of 
the Four Personae are easily identifiable, at least in the abstract, an understanding of 
those arguments, and of their characteristic features, helps to illuminate the enduring 
nature of constitutional disagreement. 
                                                      
164 See  DWORKIN, supra note. 
165 Id. 
166 See Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, supra note. 
167 For an empirical test, see Cross, supra note. 
168 See Vermeule, supra  note. 
169 This is a version of the familiar choice between rules and standards. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus 
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992). 
170 See Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between 
Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1611 (1988). 
171 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
172 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
173 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
174 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 113 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
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Different theories of constitutional interpretation can lead judges to adopt one or 
another of the Personae, depending on the controversy. Hence it should be no surprise, 
and no cause for embarrassment, if a judge turns out to be a Hero on Monday and a 
Soldier on Tuesday. We can also find incompletely theorized agreements175 in favor of 
heroism, soldiering, Burkeanism, or muteness – as, for example, when judges with 
different methodological commitments converge on silence.176 And while I have 
contended that a theory of constitutional interpretation is logically prior to the choice of 
a Persona, it is not at all unreasonable to speculate that a Persona might be adopted for 
strategic reasons, or that a Persona might have special appeal for psychological reasons. 
 
No judgment about the role of the courts, or about Constitutional Personae, can 
sensibly be made in the abstract, or independently of concrete judgments about what 
can be counted as a mistake, and about who is likely to be trustworthy. In some 
imaginable worlds, Heroes are heroes; in others, they are hardly that, and they may 
even be villains. In some imaginable worlds, Soldiers respect democracy without 
jeopardizing anything of importance; in others, they leave fundamental rights 
vulnerable to unreliable majorities. In some imaginable worlds, Burkeans strike the 
proper balance between self-government and other values; in others, they are far too 
cautious, and their incrementalism is a vice. In some imaginable worlds, Mutes make 
silence golden; in others, they capitulate to the worst forms of injustice and 
overreaching. The right Persona depends on the plot of the play. 
                                                      
175 See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995). 
176 See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 113 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
